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Abstract  15 
Background: The ongoing coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has placed an 16 
unprecedented strain on global society, healthcare, governments and mass media. Public 17 
dissemination of government policies, medical interventions and misinformation has been 18 
remarkably rapid and largely unregulated during the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in 19 
increased misinterpretations, miscommunication, and public panic. Being the first full-scale 20 
global pandemic of the digital age, COVID-19 has presented novel challenges pertinent to 21 
government advice, the spread of news and misinformation, and the trade-off between the 22 
accessibility of science and the premature public use of unproven medical interventions.  23 
Objectives:  This study aims to assess the use of internet search terms relating to 24 
COVID-19 information and misinformation during the global pandemic, identify which were 25 
most used in six affected countries, investigate any temporal trends and the likely 26 
propagators of key search terms, and determine any correlation between the per capita 27 
cases and deaths with the adoption of these search terms in each of the six countries.  28 
Methods:  This study uses relative search volume data extracted from Google 29 
Trends for search terms linked to the COVID-19 pandemic alongside per capita case and 30 
mortality data extracted from the European Open Data Portal, to identify the temporal 31 
dynamics of the spread of news and misinformation during the global pandemic in six 32 
affected countries (Australia, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, United States of 33 
America). A correlation analysis was carried out to ascertain any correlation between the 34 
temporal trends of search term use and the rise of per capita mortality and disease cases. 35 
Results:  Of the selected search terms, most were searched immediately 36 
following promotion by governments, public figures or viral circulation of information, but 37 
also relating to the publication of scientific resources, which were sometimes misinterpreted 38 
before further dissemination. Strong correlations were identified between the volume of 39 
these COVID-19-related search terms (overall mean Spearman’s rho = 0.753 ± 0.158), and 40 
per capita mortality (mean per capita deaths Spearman’s rho = 0.690 ± 0.168) and cases 41 
(mean per capita cases Spearman’s rho = 0.800 ± 0.112; Figure 8; Table 2&S1). 42 
Conclusions: These findings illustrate the increased rate and volume of public 43 
consumption of novel information during a global healthcare crisis. The strong positive 44 
 3 
correlation between mortality and online searching, particularly in countries with lower 45 
COVID-19 testing rates, may demonstrate the imperative to safeguard official 46 
communications and dispel misinformation in these countries. Online news, government 47 
briefings and social media provide a powerful tool for the dissemination of important 48 
information to the public during pandemics, but their misuse, and the presentation of 49 
misrepresented medical information, should be monitored, minimised and addressed to 50 
safeguard public safety. Ultimately, governments, public health authorities and scientists 51 
have a moral imperative to safeguard the truth and maintain an accessible discourse with 52 
the public to limit fear. 53 
 54 
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Introduction 57 
The COVID-19 pandemic has encouraged an unprecedented international panic. Since its 58 
emergence in late 2019 in the Hubei province of China, COVID-19 has spread globally, and 59 
its associated infectivity and death rate have challenged world leaders, healthcare systems 60 
and the public[1, 2]. Unlike comparable previous pandemics, such as the Spanish flu in 61 
1918, the internet has provided to the public a source of connectivity and a means to rapidly 62 
acquire emerging information about the virus[1]. The information available is, however, not 63 
always verifiable or scientifically supported. 64 
 65 
The dissemination of government policy and cutting-edge medical research is 66 
unquestionably important in the remit of a global pandemic, but misinterpretation is 67 
commonplace. The desperation of the public encourages the opportunistic adoption of 68 
unverified medical interventions. The misuse and misrepresentation of such information 69 
presents a critical challenge to governments and to the public. Equally, the public may seek 70 
out and enable misinformation (e.g. the virus being spread by 5G towers[3]) which is rapidly 71 
distributed via social media[4]. The increased dependence of the public on social media and 72 
other inherently biased sources of information may inflate the rate at which misinformation 73 
spreads, possibly fostering disenfranchisement with government and healthcare 74 
organisations[5-7]. This could ultimately provoke disregard toward restrictions enforced for 75 
public safety, lead to reduced supplies of medicines and personal protective equipment, or 76 
potentially even to reduced medical engagement and worsening of chronic conditions, 77 
increasing pressure on already strained healthcare providers. 78 
 79 
Given the rapid flow of digital information during the COVID-19 pandemic, real-time data 80 
collection and analysis provides an unparalleled opportunity to assess the public response 81 
to information as it emerges. Through internet-derived information from social media, news 82 
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and search engine use, public reactions and perceptions can be assessed real-time[4, 8-83 
11]. Google Trends (GT) has been used for the analysis of epidemiologically relevant data 84 
regarding influenza[9], disease outbreaks[10], but also, more recently, COVID-19[11]. By 85 
assessing the temporal dynamics of search terms related to the pandemic, particularly those 86 
relating to misinformation, it is possible to infer likely sources, propagators and impacts. This 87 
study employs GT for the analysis of search terms used during the COVID-19 pandemic 88 
relating to government policy, potential treatments, and misinformation, specifically in three 89 
English and three non-English speaking countries: Australia, United Kingdom (UK), United 90 
States of America (USA), Germany, Italy and Spain. The aims of this study are to identify 91 
any correlation between the relative search volumes for information relating to the first wave 92 
of the pandemic, and to discuss these search volumes in the context of emerging news, 93 
alongside the prevalence of cases and deaths in each of the six focal countries.  94 
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Methods 95 
Mortality, case and testing data extraction 96 
Worldwide mortality and case data, and country population sizes were extracted from the 97 
European Union Open Data Portal[12] on 17th April 2020 (Figure 1). Data were retained only 98 
for the six focal countries. Dates for which no data were available from 1st November 2019 99 
to the first recorded numbers for that country were marked as zero. Per capita cases and 100 
deaths were also calculated using the included population sizes and retained for later 101 
analyses and figures. Per capita values, while not widely reported by the media at this time, 102 
were used in this study to correct for the large variation in population sizes of the focal 103 
countries, and to better represent the proportional pressure upon each country.  104 
 105 
The objective reliability of these data is questionable given the internationally variable extent 106 
of testing and the resultant predicted inaccuracy of the case numbers in each country. 107 
International variations in the definition of COVID-19-related deaths and failures to report 108 
the full extent of case numbers also warrant scepticism. In the remit of this study, however, 109 
these data represent the immediate perceived threat and pressure elicited upon the 110 
societies of each focal country, thus providing a suitable comparison against the temporal 111 
dynamics of the search terms used. The numbers of COVID-19 tests per thousand citizens 112 
were downloaded from Our World in Data[13]; given the irregularity of testing and resultant 113 
unavailability of data for some countries, these data were not used for correlation analysis. 114 
The number of tests completed by 17th April 2020 was recorded, except for Germany and 115 
Spain for which values represented the tests per thousand completed by the 19th and 13th 116 
April, respectively, due to a lack of data for the 17th. Testing data represent the number of 117 
tests performed, rather than the number of individuals tested, given the wider availability of 118 
these data; the nature of Australia’s testing units is, however, unclear. 119 
 120 
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Search volume data extraction 121 
Data were extracted from Google Trends (GT) on 17th April 2020 for the period of 1st 122 
November 2019 to 17th April 2020, which includes a brief period before the first confirmed 123 
case of COVID-19 for comparison. These data provide a proxy for public interest in 124 
government policy, emerging healthcare interventions, and misinformation, later 125 
contextualised as a response to the release of such information. The data extracted from 126 
GT are relative search volumes (RSVs) for pre-determined search terms, allowing 127 
comparison of search rates for different terms via Google, the most widely-used internet 128 
search engine, especially in the countries selected[14, 15]. These RSVs are presented for 129 
each date of a given time period within a given country. Data are normalised relative to the 130 
highest RSV peak in that time period (this peak represented as 100).  131 
 132 
Data were extracted for searches generated from Australia, Germany, Italy, Spain, the 133 
United Kingdom and the United States of America. These countries were selected due to 134 
their widespread use of Google (precluding China and many other Asiatic countries), 135 
variation in the extent to which they were impacted by the pandemic, nuances in their 136 
responses to the pandemic, and the accessibility of their news and media in one 137 
predominant language. All search terms were preceded by “coronavirus” to ensure 138 
relevance to the pandemic; “coronavirus” was selected over “COVID19” and similar terms 139 
due to its greater prevalence of searches (e.g. in the USA, “coronavirus vaccine” yielded 140 
four-fold the search volume of “corona vaccine” and “covid vaccine”, and twenty-fold that of 141 
“covid19 vaccine” and “covid-19 vaccine”).  142 
 143 
All search terms were selected based on their widespread media coverage and their high 144 
Google search volumes. Their placement in the broad categories of ‘government policy’, 145 
‘medical interventions’ and ‘misinformation’ were based on the context of their wide reporting 146 
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by media, government, research and healthcare organisations of those particular countries. 147 
The designation of search terms as ‘medical interventions’ did not equate to their 148 
effectiveness in treating COVID-19 but scientific discussion around or political endorsement 149 
of both their experimental or genuine use in treating the virus. Chloroquine, for example, 150 
was not empirically shown to benefit patients at the time of this study and its early 151 
endorsement during the pandemic largely emanated from the USA, but international 152 
research nonetheless endeavoured to ascertain any benefit it conferred to COVID-19 153 
patients, this being the primary focus of its initial widespread news coverage. Misinformation 154 
search terms were labelled as such when there was no empirical evidence, nor active 155 
published peer reviewed research, regarding their relevance to COVID-19 and their media 156 
coverage indicative of their potential for controversy; such search terms could often be 157 
traced back to an initial misinterpretation or false statement, some of which are highlighted 158 
in the discussion. All terms were identified as COVID-19 misinformation by Dhillon et al[16]. 159 
Other search terms relevant to COVID-19 were considered, but for a contained and 160 
meaningful statistically significant comparison only those with relatively high and 161 
comparable RSVs within the three aforementioned categories were included. Search terms 162 
for which variations were possible (e.g. chloroquine vs. hydroxychloroquine) were included 163 
as the variation with the greatest GT search volume with the simpler terminology routinely 164 
having the greatest search volume. 165 
 166 
Searches were carried out in the language native to each respective country unless the 167 
English terms provided a greater number of results (i.e. where English phraseology was 168 
adopted). Searches were carried out in batches to identify relative differences in search 169 
volumes, with three batches coarsely defined as “government policies”, “medical 170 
interventions” and “misinformation”. All search batches contained “coronavirus chloroquine” 171 
as a standard to facilitate some comparison between categories given its relatively central 172 
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positioning in most batches. Chloroquine was selected for its relatively average search 173 
volume across countries and categories, acting as an anchor to facilitate visual comparison 174 
between higher and lower RSVs. The search term RSVs were all also individually 175 
downloaded (independently normalised with the highest peak being 100) for subsequent 176 
correlation analysis to evenly represent the extent of searching and focus on the temporal 177 
dynamics. Given the representation of numbers less than one as “<1” by GT, all RSVs of 178 
“<1” were converted to 0.5 to facilitate quantitative comparison.  179 
 180 
The government policy search terms comprised chloroquine (control standardisation term), 181 
social distancing, sanitizer, mask, isolation, gloves and testing (Table 1). Social distancing 182 
was implemented by many countries as an early and maintained means to prevent viral 183 
spread, as was isolation, although the latter may also have been searched in association 184 
with the wellbeing and mental health consequences of reduced social contact during lock-185 
down. The use of sanitizer for cleansing of hands was also encouraged by governments 186 
throughout the pandemic, although depleting public availability in most countries led many 187 
to attempt to create home-made sanitizer[17]. Masks and gloves were employed as a 188 
protective means to prevent spread, although predominantly by frontline healthcare 189 
workers; public purchase of this personal protective equipment (PPE) was problematic in 190 
many countries, resulting in reduced availability for medical practitioners[18, 19]. Testing 191 
and tracing was carried out for coronavirus, but the extent of testing and the national focus 192 
on its importance varied internationally[13]. The US spelling of “sanitizer” was maintained 193 
for the UK searches given a higher prevalence than the UK spelling “sanitiser”. Due to the 194 
GT search limit, the government policy search was split into two batches (batch 1: 195 
chloroquine, social distancing, sanitizer, mask and isolation, and batch 2: chloroquine, 196 
gloves and testing, with linguistic variations for Germany, Italy and Spain). 197 
 10 
The medical intervention search terms comprised chloroquine (control standardisation 198 
term), remdesivir, paracetamol, vaccine and ibuprofen (Table 1). All of these search terms 199 
pertain to treatments that were suggested to have potential against COVID-19 symptoms. 200 
The public focus on vaccines reflected the ongoing development of vaccines and the desire 201 
for relief from the pandemic[20]. Paracetamol and ibuprofen were used to subdue pain 202 
associated with COVID-19 symptoms, but public perception became antagonistic toward 203 
using ibuprofen for COVID-19 symptoms which shifted focus toward paracetamol[21].  204 
 205 
The misinformation search terms comprised chloroquine (control term), 5G, man-made and 206 
lab (Table 1). These search terms pertain to internationally prevalent misinformation related 207 
to COVID-19, often specifically suggesting a disingenuous cause or source of the viral 208 
spread. Specifically, these entail theories that the virus was being spread by the new 5G 209 
phone masts, that the virus was manufactured, and that the virus was released from a 210 
laboratory[3, 16, 22-24]. All of which have subsequently been debunked[25-27]. 211 
 212 
 213 
 214 
 215 
 216 
 217 
 218 
 219 
 220 
 221 
 222 
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Table 1. GT search terms used in each of the three categories. Every search term was 223 
preceded by ‘coronavirus’, and ‘coronavirus chloroquine’ (and its translations) was 224 
also included within all three categories as a control term. Where English search 225 
terms were used for non-English-speaking countries, the English search terms had a 226 
greater number of searches. 227 
Government Policy 
Australia, UK 
& USA 
social 
distancing 
sanitizer mask isolation gloves testing 
Germany social 
distancing 
desinfektion-
smittel 
maske isolation handschuhe testen 
Italy distanziamento 
sociale 
disinfettante maschera isolamento guanti analisi 
Spain distanciamiento 
social 
desinfectante mascara aislamiento guantes pruebas 
Medical Interventions 
Australia, UK 
& USA 
chloroquine remdesivir paracetamol vaccine ibuprofen 
Germany 
chloroquin remdesivir paracetamol impstoff ibuprofen 
Italy 
clorochina remdesivir paracetamolo vaccino ibuprofene 
Spain 
cloroquina remdesivir paracetamol vacuna ibuprofeno 
Misinformation 
Australia, UK 
& USA 
5G man made lab 
Germany 
5G hergestellt labor 
Italy 
5G creato laboratorio 
Spain 
5G creado laboratorio 
 228 
 229 
 230 
 231 
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Statistical analysis 232 
Statistical analyses and plotting of data were carried out using R version v4.0.0[28]. Line 233 
graphs were created for per capita cases and deaths, and a bar chat for tests per thousand 234 
citizens using ‘ggplot’ in the ‘ggplot2’ package version 3.3.0 in R[29], with colours assigned 235 
via the ‘RColorBrewer’ package v1.1-2[30]. The data were identified as non-normally 236 
distributed via Shapiro-Wilk tests, so non-parametric statistical analyses were selected. 237 
Correlations between RSVs and per capita deaths and cases were tested using Spearman’s 238 
rho rank correlation via the ‘rcor’ function of the ‘Hmisc package version 4.4-0[31]. The output 239 
was then presented in a correlogram via the ‘corrplot’ function of the ‘corrplot’ package 240 
version 0.84[32], with colours assigned via the ‘viridis’ package v 0.5.1[33]. Line graphs 241 
were created for each of the three categories of search terms for each country to aid 242 
comparison of both the extent and temporality of RSV trends in GraphPad Prism version 243 
8[34]. All statistical data is included in appendix 1. 244 
 245 
Information sources and reliability 246 
The sources for the non-search-term data (The European Union Open Data Portal and Our 247 
World in Data) are reputable sources that derive their data from official national reports, 248 
scientific publications and other reliable sources. The data extracted from these sources 249 
align with those published internationally in response to the pandemic situation as it 250 
develops. The Google Trends data are collected and presented by Google based on the 251 
input of users of their service, thus should be fully reliable. While most sources cited in this 252 
report are from reputable scientific, government or public health authority sources, others 253 
discussed throughout the manuscript are taken from mass media, social media and other 254 
heavily biased sources, or from scientific articles that discuss such sources; these sources 255 
are being referred to on the basis of these biases or simply to refer to the temporal 256 
development and emergence of global news, for which bias in an important factor. The 257 
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manuscript discusses the reporting of this information in an objective manner, with no 258 
subscription to the reported ideals or beliefs represented in the text.  259 
 14 
Results 260 
Mortality, case and test results 261 
All countries show similar per capita case (Figure 2) and death (Figure 3) trends temporally, 262 
with both beginning to exponentially increase in most countries between late February and 263 
early March. Of the six countries, Italy is the first to present a substantial number of cases 264 
and deaths (mid-February). Australia, the UK and the USA are the last to experience rapidly 265 
increasing per capita case numbers (~10th March). The per capita case number trends are 266 
relatively similar in their extents for most countries, except for Spain, which exhibits 267 
approximately 50% more peak per capita cases than the second highest peak (the UK) 268 
(Spain: 0.01937, UK: 0.013113), and Australia, which exhibits approximately a quarter of 269 
the peak per capita cases of the majority of the countries (Australia: 0.002445 for Australia, 270 
average for other countries, excluding Spain: 0.010603 ± 0.0023). The per capita deaths 271 
similarly increase last for Australia, the UK and the USA, but also Germany. Germany and 272 
the USA display a shallower trajectory of per capita death increases, and Australia shows a 273 
minor peak of per capita deaths. Spain again exhibits the greatest peak of per capita deaths, 274 
but only with an approximate 30% increase over the peaks of Italy, the UK and the USA 275 
(Spain: 0.002033, Italy: 0.001607, UK: 0.001474, USA: 0.001506) (compared to the ~50% 276 
increase over the second highest peak for per capita cases). Testing for COVID-19 varied 277 
massively between countries, with Germany showing the highest tests per thousand, with 278 
around 25 tests per thousand, and the UK showing the lowest with around 6.5 tests per 279 
thousand (Figure 4).  280 
 281 
Search volume results 282 
Of the government policy search terms (Figure 5), “testing” was prevalent in all countries, 283 
and “isolation” relatively high in all but the USA and Germany. “Sanitizer” was highly 284 
searched in Germany, Italy and Spain. “Masks” was highly searched in Australia, Germany, 285 
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Italy and the USA, and to a lesser extent, the UK. “Gloves” was searched relatively less in 286 
all but Italy and Spain. “Social distancing” was searched less except in Australia and the 287 
UK, where this term was the 3rd most searched. Most search terms peaked at a similar time 288 
(mid-March) in most countries, although “mask” also peaked in late January/early February 289 
in Australia, the UK and the USA, and to a lesser extent in Germany and Italy. In Germany 290 
and Italy, “sanitizer” and “mask” peaked in early March, 2-3 weeks earlier than a later peak 291 
coinciding with that of “testing” in other countries. In the USA, “gloves” was searched most 292 
at the end of February, but also with a second peak in early April, unlike the other countries. 293 
In Italy, searches of “testing” peaked sporadically from late February to mid-April (the end 294 
of the search period), with larger peaks spread further across the period. 295 
 296 
Of the medical intervention search terms (Figure 6), “vaccine” was very highly searched in 297 
all countries, peaking in late March, except in Germany, where it peaked in late February, 298 
and Italy, where it peaked sporadically from the end of January to mid-April (the end of the 299 
search period). In the UK, “vaccine” had a second peak in mid-April. The other medical 300 
interventions had relatively small peaks, often in mid-late March. “Remdesivir” peaked 301 
higher in Italy relative to the other countries. “Chloroquine” peaked much higher in the USA 302 
relative to the other countries, also having a smaller peak in the UK. “Ibuprofen” was the 303 
highest peak in Germany and the UK, peaking in all countries in mid-late March, and having 304 
a second peak in early April in the USA. 305 
 306 
Of the misinformation search terms (Figure 7), “5G” had erratic smaller peaks throughout 307 
mid-late March, but peaked in most countries in early April, with Germany and Spain 308 
displaying reduced peaks. “Man made” was mostly searched in mid-March, with some 309 
wider-spread erratic peaks in all but the UK, and a substantial peak in late-January/early-310 
February in Australia, Italy and Spain. “Lab” was searched relatively little in Australia, the 311 
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UK and, to some extent, the USA. “Lab” was, however, highly searched in Italy and Spain 312 
in late March, with Italy also exhibiting large peaks in late January and late February and 313 
was searched at similar intervals in “Germany”, but never so proportionally high as Italy and 314 
Spain. In most cases, peaks of “lab” coincide with peaks of “man made”. 315 
 316 
 317 
Correlation analysis results 318 
In all countries, almost all normalised search terms significantly positively correlated with 319 
one another (overall mean Spearman’s rho = 0.753 ± 0.158) and per capita deaths (mean 320 
per capita deaths Spearman’s rho = 0.690 ± 0.168) and cases (mean per capita cases 321 
Spearman’s rho = 0.800 ± 0.112; Figure 8; Table 2; Table S1); the only exception was the 322 
non-significant association between per capita deaths and remdesivir RSV in Australia 323 
(Spearman’s rho = 0.134, P = .081). Overall, stronger correlations were identified more 324 
universally for the UK (mean Spearman’s rho = 0.851 ± 0.066) and the USA (mean 325 
Spearman’s rho = 0.873 ± 0.058), while relatively weaker correlations were shown for 326 
Australia (mean Spearman’s rho = 0.641 ± 0.150) and Germany (mean Spearman’s rho = 327 
0.632 ± 0.157; Figure 8; Table 2; Table S1). In Italy and Spain, the weakest correlations 328 
were those between social distancing and all other variables. 329 
 330 
Table 2: Mean Spearman’s rho rank coefficients and their standard deviations are 331 
given for each country and overall results for all six countries. The mean of all 332 
assessed correlations, correlations including the progressive days across the focal 333 
time period, and correlations including per capita cases and deaths are given. 334 
 335 
 Overall 
Correlation 
Time 
Correlation 
Cases 
Correlation 
Deaths 
Correlation 
All 0.753 ± 0.158 0.769 ± 0.122 0.800 ± 0.112 0.690 ± 0.168 
Australia 0.641 ± 0.150 0.701 ± 0.136 0.732 ± 0.122 0.495 ± 0.146 
Germany 0.632 ± 0.157 0.681 ± 0.143 0.719 ± 0.123 0.535 ± 0.153 
 17 
Italy 0.753 ± 0.147 0.772 ± 0.093 0.819 ± 0.103 0.796 ± 0.104 
Spain 0.766 ± 0.152 0.764 ± 0.120 0.826 ± 0.133 0.762 ± 0.116 
UK 0.851 ± 0.066 0.835 ± 0.052 0.846 ± 0.037 0.750 ± 0.075 
USA 0.873 ± 0.058 0.861 ± 0.047 0.858 ± 0.024 0.802 ± 0.056 
  336 
 18 
Discussion 337 
This study aimed to identify any correlation between the internet searching of defined 338 
COVID-19-relevant search terms and the per capita cases and deaths in six countries. We 339 
identified a strong positive correlation between the cases and deaths relating to COVID-19, 340 
and online searches surrounding government policies, medical interventions and scientific 341 
misinformation. 342 
 343 
Principal results 344 
Between the 1st of November 2019 and 17th of April 2020, per capita deaths and cases 345 
showed a similar trend across the six countries, with all having reached or passed peak daily 346 
new cases during the first wave of the pandemic. However, Australia and Germany 347 
experienced fewer deaths during this time period, allowing for a direct comparison of the 348 
search trends across countries with high and low COVID-19 cases and deaths. Where the 349 
ratio of mortality to cases is higher, such as the UK, which had the highest excess deaths in 350 
Europe during this period[35], this could reflect strained healthcare provision, delayed or 351 
reduced effectiveness of preventative measures, poorer testing effort, or a combination of 352 
all of these[36, 37]. Disparity in testing across countries may also have exacerbated 353 
differences in mortality. The importance of testing is illustrated by its high RSV across all 354 
countries (Figure 5) and the finding that the greatest degree of testing (Germany) aligns with 355 
relatively low mortality and weak correlations between RSVs and case load. Where testing 356 
and contact tracing have been employed (e.g. Germany, South Korea), they have been 357 
undoubtedly effective in mitigating increases in cases and deaths[38, 39], possibly leading 358 
to an increased media and public interest in testing, predominantly it seems in countries 359 
where it is lacking.  360 
 361 
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Overall, stronger correlations were observed in the UK and USA. The English-speaking 362 
majority of these countries could explain this, given the widespread use of English on social 363 
media and in international news. In direct contrast, Australia had some of the weakest 364 
overall correlations; the combined low per capita deaths and cases and the earlier 365 
application of travel restrictions and a two week quarantine[40, 41] may have fostered a 366 
greater sense of safety and therefore less need by individuals to focus on the pandemic, 367 
evidenced by reduced interest in medical interventions. The overall strength of correlations 368 
being weakest in Australia and Germany, where the case and death figures are lower, 369 
supports the association between reduced public pressure and a less coordinated uptake 370 
of news and misinformation.  371 
 372 
That in almost all cases per capita deaths and cases correlated with the search term RSVs 373 
further suggests a strong relationship between the pressure elicited upon the public and 374 
their receptibility to pandemic related digital information. The virus was internationally 375 
recognised and regularly reported by most international news sources by January[2], with 376 
many of the proposed preventative measures and medical interventions being widely 377 
searched online before cases and deaths began to emerge (Figures 5 & 6). The peak of 378 
most RSVs in mid-March, aligning approximately with peak per capita deaths and cases 379 
(Figures 1 & 2), also coincide with the beginning of lock-down in many countries[42], 380 
suggesting that populations were well informed pre-lockdown and ready for substantial 381 
changes to living conditions. The more dramatic peaks of search term RSVs following the 382 
beginning of March may denote the public searching news-relevant topics in far greater 383 
volume due to their willingness to follow government guidance, increased anxiety, and free 384 
time. In Italy, however, RSV peaks arrived earlier, likely due to the earlier arrival of the virus. 385 
The later peaks, which are often larger, may be propagated by greater exposure to 386 
mainstream and social media whilst at home and increased levels of anxiety (Figure S1)[43, 387 
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44] thus creating a “second wave”. This relatively erratic persistent search behaviour, 388 
particularly surrounding misinformation, could indicate heightened public panic especially 389 
as per capita deaths increase.  390 
 391 
The data in this study highlights the utility of infoveillance in assessing public readiness for 392 
and adoption of preventative measures. The early interest in masks observed in the USA 393 
and Australia could indicate a willingness for, or pre-emptive fear of, the use of PPE. Despite 394 
some anti-mask sentiment in politicians[45], and possible reluctance by governments to 395 
impose mask-wearing for fear of appearing dictatorial, the public may be more prepared for 396 
discourse surrounding PPE than expected given the high RSVs. Conversely, social 397 
distancing consistently correlated weakly with other search terms, specifically in Germany, 398 
Italy and Spain, despite all three countries entering nationwide lockdowns and observing 399 
government mandated social distancing rules. Given the use of translated search terms, 400 
where these received more searches than the English equivalent, this is unlikely to be due 401 
to linguistic differences, despite these comprising only the non-English-speaking countries. 402 
In some countries, strict enforcement of social distancing may not have been necessary due 403 
to greater compliance with guidelines (Germany). Alternatively, social distancing may not 404 
have been so heavily emphasised or adhered to in some countries resulting in government 405 
enforced curfews with fines for non-compliance, as experienced in Italy[46, 47]. Regardless, 406 
clear and repeated guidance should be provided by governments to ensure compliance by 407 
their citizens. Good government response has been credited with the rapid reduction of lock-408 
down measures in some countries, but such responses need to be data-driven[38, 48] and 409 
GT can provide an effective proxy for the extent of public adherence to this guidance.  410 
 411 
Public interest in medical interventions was similarly moderately consistent between 412 
countries, with ibuprofen and chloroquine being the most searched. Some of this search 413 
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intensity likely arose from misinformation, for example, the high RSVs for co-incided with a 414 
scientific correspondence to The Lancet hypothesising a heightened risk to a subset of 415 
patients with hypertension and diabetes should they take ibuprofen to combat COVID-416 
19[21]. This correspondence became mis-represented on messaging platforms and in 417 
media[16, 49] as “evidence” that ibuprofen worsened COVID-19 symptoms. Furthermore, a 418 
second ibuprofen RSV peak in April in the USA coincided with a viral social media message 419 
claiming that COVID-19 patients using ibuprofen did not recover[16]. The European 420 
Medicines Agency (EMA) and the USA Food and Drug Association (FDA) quickly discredited 421 
this as misinformation, possibly explaining the ephemerality of the RSV peak[25, 26]. 422 
Paracetamol was highly searched simultaneously with ibuprofen, suggesting that people 423 
were seeking alternatives[50]. That the ibuprofen RSV comprises the highest medical 424 
intervention search peak in the UK and Germany, and a relatively high peak in other 425 
countries, compared to lower RSVs for experimental COVID-19 disease-modifying drugs, 426 
such as remdesivir[51], confirms the capacity of misinformation to penetrate the public 427 
consciousness. Although this may also reflect the less familiar names and scientific 428 
background of the experimental drugs. This is further evidenced by the much larger RSVs 429 
for ‘vaccine’ across all countries, a term familiar with most people, yet a therapeutic option 430 
that is clearly much further from public availability than therapies such as remdesivir[52]. 431 
The second peak of interest in vaccines in the UK was likely propagated by UK media 432 
reporting the initiation of clinical trials at the University of Oxford[53]. It is worth noting 433 
however that one experimental drug, namely chloroquine, was searched with far greater 434 
intensity in the USA. This is likely due to US government briefings that supported 435 
chloroquine as a potential treatment for COVID-19[54] based on a small clinical study[55], 436 
which led to multiple larger studies that ultimately did not support the outcomes[55, 56] with 437 
most trials now suspended as reviewed here[57] and following some reports of accidental 438 
self-poisoning[58]. The important role of clear guidance from government is further 439 
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exemplified from the suggestion during US government briefings that consideration should 440 
be given to the internal use of disinfectant and UV light in combating COVID-19. This is clear 441 
example of misinformation arising from misinterpreted scientific literature that led to 442 
widescale panic/increased calls to poison centres[59-61].  443 
 444 
Similarly, mass media and elected representatives have also propagated theories that 445 
SARS-CoV-2is either man-made or was leaked from a laboratory in Wuhan. A quickly 446 
retracted scientific preprint appeared to propagate this theory by providing it an undue sense 447 
of credibility[24]. Although the man-made theory was scientifically discredited[62], public 448 
discussion moved toward a “leak” of the virus[16, 23] highlighting the evolution and 449 
adaptability of misinformation, especially when supported by public figures[63]. Editors, 450 
reviewers and authors should maintain stringent safeguards to ensure appropriate 451 
publishing, even of preprints, especially regarding such sensitive topics[64]. Similar 452 
conspiracy theories, with large RSVs (Figure 7), arose via mainstream and social media 453 
outlets suggesting the spread of COVID-19 by 5G towers. The theory itself was in early 454 
circulation and despite being discredited as misinformation in January, long before the 455 
search intensity peaked[22], it led to vigilante attacks on phone masts and engineers in 456 
uninformed attempts to arrest viral spread[3, 16, 22]. The danger of misguided intervention 457 
led by misinformation outlines a clear requirement for mechanisms to reduce the spread of, 458 
whilst rationally and widely discrediting, these theories via perceivably credible sources such 459 
as national governments or professional medical bodies[1]. That the search volume 460 
surrounding 5G and ibuprofen dissipated so rapidly after documented attempts made by 461 
public health authorities such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) to curb the spread 462 
of this misinformation[25, 26] best illustrates this point. It is therefore clear that during this 463 
pandemic the consumption of mass media, social media, government announcements and 464 
health organisation releases has influenced the public perception around both the causes 465 
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and treatments of COVID-19 and, as perhaps best evidenced by the high RSVs for ibuprofen 466 
and 5G, has contributed to both public panic and healthcare issues such as reduced stocks 467 
of essential medicines caused by stockpiling[50]. 468 
 469 
Limitations of GT data 470 
This study utilised GT data for six countries in which it is the most popular, but not the only, 471 
internet search engine. However, as the most widely used it provides the best snapshot of  472 
user searches so that appropriate statistical studies can be conducted. As with any 473 
searches, the data presented in this study do not confirm subscription of those searching 474 
the terms to the ideals, interventions or policies that they represent; many of the queries that 475 
contribute to these data may have been submitted by critics and sceptics. Even such 476 
searches, however, ratify the increased public awareness, discussion and spread of the 477 
information denoted by the search terms. A greater volume of people reached by the 478 
information will undoubtedly suggest a greater number subscribing to the theories and ideas. 479 
The progression of a global pandemic is incredibly complicated and unpredictable, and the 480 
findings of this study focus on GT data from just one time period in a currently ongoing 481 
situation. While this study bears relevance primarily to the beginning of the pandemic this is 482 
arguably the most critical point at which to limit spread, however, the findings may not prove 483 
as relevant to periods when the public have adjusted to the situation. 484 
 485 
Conclusions 486 
Infoveillance has already provided a valuable tool during the COVID-19 pandemic through 487 
detection of novel symptoms[65], assessment of behaviours such as self-medication[66] 488 
and identification of outbreaks[67]. This study focuses on the public response during the 489 
early developing pandemic, particularly surrounding misinformation, government policy and 490 
medical interventions.  491 
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 492 
A study exploring the use of GT for digital epidemiology found that search term RSVs were 493 
influenced far more by media clamour than by epidemiological burden[68]. This pandemic 494 
is unique in that rapidly emerging medical research deposited in pre-print archives has been 495 
accessible and consumed by the media and public pre-peer review, leading to potentially 496 
dangerous misinterpretation, as has occurred with chloroquine[58]. While our findings ratify 497 
this, we also identified a strong positive correlation between internet searching and COVID-498 
19 deaths and cases, indicating a more synergistic combined effect of epidemiological 499 
burden and media attention. The prevalence and online spread of misinformation has been 500 
reported previously for COVID-19[1] with regard to social media platforms and, as in this 501 
study, the findings ultimately identified an important role for public health organisations and 502 
government in providing accessible online information and refutation of misinformation. 503 
Medical misinformation has drastic healthcare consequences and pre-existing 504 
misinformation, particularly that surrounding vaccines, will be a significant future obstacle in 505 
overcoming COVID-19[6]. The presentation of accurate information, including infodemiology 506 
data as illustrated in this study, to maintain societal ease is vital, and there is an imperative 507 
for scientists, public health authorities and governments to collaborate to rigorously maintain 508 
this. 509 
 510 
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Figure 1. Data extraction and workflow. 731 
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Figure 2. Per capita cases of COVID-19 during the study period. 735 
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 736 
Figure 3. Per capita COVID-19-related deaths during the study period. 737 
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 738 
Figure 4. Total COVID-19 tests per thousand citizens in the six focal countries, as of 739 
17th April 2020, except for Germany and Spain, which are represented by 19th and 740 
13th April, respectively, due a lack of data for the 17th.   741 
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 36 
Figure 5. Government policy relative search volumes (RSVs) extracted from Google 744 
Trends (GT). Grouped RSV data, normalised to the highest RSV peak in the time 745 
period (represented as 100) were extracted from GT on 17th April 2020 for the period 746 
of 1st November 2019 to 17th April 2020. Search terms included “coronavirus 747 
chloroquine” (control term), “coronavirus social distancing”, “coronavirus sanitizer”, 748 
“coronavirus mask”, “coronavirus isolation”, “coronavirus gloves” and “coronavirus 749 
testing”, with variations to reflect the language native to each country (Table 1). 750 
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Figure 6. Medical intervention relative search volumes (RSVs) extracted from Google 753 
Trends (GT). Grouped RSV data, normalised to the highest RSV peak in the time 754 
period (represented as 100) were extracted from GT on 17th April 2020 for the period 755 
of 1st November 2019 to 17th April 2020. Search terms included “coronavirus 756 
chloroquine”, “coronavirus remdesivir”, “coronavirus paracetamol”, “coronavirus 757 
vaccine” and “coronavirus ibuprofen”, with variations to reflect the language native 758 
to each country (Table 1). 759 
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Figure 7. Misinformation relative search volumes (RSVs) extracted from Google 762 
Trends (GT). Grouped RSV data, normalised to the highest RSV peak in the time 763 
period (represented as 100) were extracted from GT on 17th April 2020 for the period 764 
of 1st November 2019 to 17th April 2020. Search terms included “coronavirus 765 
chloroquine”, “coronavirus remdesivir”, “coronavirus paracetamol”, “coronavirus 766 
vaccine” and “coronavirus ibuprofen”, with variations to reflect the language native 767 
to each country (Table 1). 768 
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 770 
 42 
Figure 8. Correlograms for the search factors, and per capita case and death rates for 771 
each country. The size of each circle indicates the strength of the correlation, as does 772 
the colour, denoted by the scale bar, with yellow and purple denoting positive and 773 
negative correlations, respectively. 774 
